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A variety of purchasing and eating practices—vegetarianism, veganism, pescatarianism, loca-
vorism, etc.—are often motivated along broadly  act consequentialist lines.  That is, these sorts 
of practices are often motivated by the thought that individual decisions not to purchase meat 
(I’ll focus on just this example here) matter for the world.  Or, at the very least, that this sort of 
decision has a decent chance of mattering.  Fewer animals will lead short and unhappy lives, 
fewer animals will die badly, and the world will generally be a better, happier place.  The reason-
ing here seems hard to dispute: you should do what maximizes expected goodness.  Purchases 
signal the market to produce more or less of a certain good, or to deliver it in one way as op-
posed to another.  These signals can be expected to result in better or worse outcomes.  You 
should therefore signal the market to produce fewer goods that, overall, reduce the goodness of 
the world.  So unless one wants to cast doubt on the entire apparatus of market signaling, it will 
be hard to dispute that—assuming that treating animals how we do on contemporary factory 
farms is generally a bad thing—we will have strong consequentialist reasons to refrain from pur-
chasing meat.  Or so it would seem.
There is, however, a serious concern with this line of reasoning, and one that has been lurking 
in the background of such arguments for some time.  Suppose that one derives some non-trivial 
enjoyment from eating meat.  How should the value of this enjoyment be weighed against the 
value of this market signaling effect?  The enjoyment, recall, is guaranteed.  The signal may or 
may not lead to a change in production and distribution practices.  And, at the end of the day, 
consequentialists care about consequences (or at least expected consequences).  It looks, 
therefore, like empirical facts about how likely it is that one’s purchasing habits will have an ef-
fect on subsequent production and distribution practices may matter quite a bit for whether act 
consequentialism will recommend adopting a vegetarian set of eating and purchasing practices.
To illustrate the point, consider the following example: suppose that all of the world’s chickens 
are produced by a global monopoly called “Chicken Demon”.   Chicken Demon is run by an ec1 -
centric billionaire, “The Colonel”, who loves nothing more than torturing and killing chickens. 
Chicken Demon raises as many chickens in as many countries the world over as the available 
resources will permit; the operation is not sensitive to profits and The Colonel effectively has an 
endless supply of money to support Chicken Demon if it slides into unprofitability.  The Colonel 
is a good free-market capitalist, however, so if people are willing to pay for the byproduct of his 
chicken-torturing and -killing enterprise, i.e. chicken carcasses, he is more than willing to sell 
these carcasses for a tidy profit.  The important thing is that The Colonel, and hence Chicken 
Demon, isn’t motivated by the amount of money coming in.  What The Colonel cares about is 
torturing and killing chickens, and he has the resources to pursue that goal to his heart’s con-
tent.  So while there is a market signal generated by global chicken-demand, Chicken Demon’s 
behavior is insensitive to that signal.  In this scenario, act consequentialism can offer no reason 
to refrain from eating chicken.  One’s choosing to eat chicken or not to do so will send a market 
signal, but that signal is guaranteed to have no effect on the morally relevant behavior, i.e. tor-
turing and killing chickens.  So the act consequentialist’s argument for vegetarianism turns out 
to be contingent on certain empirical facts—and, in particular, on producers exhibiting a certain 
 This is an exaggerated version of Mark Budolfson’s “waste” example from his “The Inefficacy 1
Objection and the Problem with the Singer/Norcross/Kagan Response”.
degree of sensitivity to market signaling.  For act consequentialism to recommend being vege-
tarian, there needs to be at least some chance that one is going to make a difference.
This much has been acknowledged by consequentialists like Peter Singer, Alastair Norcross, 
and Shelly Kagan.  What these authors have claimed is that our world is relevantly different 
from the world of my Chicken Demon example.  In our world, the individuals and corporations 
that produce chickens and other foodstuffs are sensitive to the decisions of consumers.  The 
question is just how sensitive they are, and how we are to conceive of this sensitivity as matter-
ing for the subsequent state of the world.  To help us get this question in view, let us consider a 
contrasting scenario, one of perfect market sensitivity.  
 
Suppose once more that there is a global chicken monopoly, “Chicken Angel”.  Chicken Angel, 
run by the eccentric billionaire “The Corporal”, is concerned to eliminate all waste and unneces-
sary harm in the chicken-production industry.  As a result, when one wants to purchase a chick-
en, one enters an order at a Chicken Angel franchise.  Chicken Angel then undertakes to raise 
one more chicken in their facilities.  One to two months later, a chicken carcass is delivered to 
one’s door (in the unlikely event that one’s chicken dies of natural causes before maturity, de-
lays may ensue).  In contrast to Chicken Demon, Chicken Angel is perfectly sensitive to market 
signals; for every purchase of a chicken, one more chicken is raised and killed.  Thus, suppos-
ing that the pleasure one derives from eating that chicken is less weighty, morally speaking, 
than the harm done to the chicken, act consequentialism will tell straightforwardly against ever 
ordering a chicken from Chicken Angel.2
Of course, we live in neither the world of Chicken Demon nor the world of Chicken Angel.  And 
we might well wonder: what does act consequentialism recommend in our world?  Singer, Nor-
cross, and Kagan have all claimed that, in the morally relevant sense, our world is more like the 
world of Chicken Angel.  We can expect to make a difference.  Thus, we should refrain from 
purchasing meat.  Recently, Mark Budolfson (“You Don’t Make a Difference”) has argued that 
the reasoning behind Singer, Norcross, and Kagan’s confidence here is fallacious, and based 
on what he calls the “Average Effects Fallacy”.  I will argue, briefly, that neither is quite right.
Singer, Norcross, and Kagan all reason more or less as follows.  Suppose that chickens are in 
fact purchased in batches of 25.  And suppose that your local butcher will order a new batch 
whenever 23 chickens have been sold.  At the end of the day, he throws out any remaining 
chickens.  This means that you will be a difference maker only if you purchase the 23rd chicken. 
Otherwise, nothing will change in the world as the result of your purchase (the butcher will never 
go out of business as the result of selling one less chicken).  Your chance of being a difference 
maker would seem, naturally enough, to be 1 in 25.  So it looks like you have a 1 in 25 chance 
of being a difference maker with respect to 25 chickens.  The expected badness of your act is 
thus equivalent to killing one chicken yourself.   In other words, the badness of the purchase is 3
 Two notes here: first, it may well be that there are restaurants in the real world that are rele2 -
vantly similar to Chicken Angel, though on a smaller scale. Second, something akin Non-Identity 
Problem (see chapter XX) rears its head here.  Basically, we might ask whether it is better for 
one more chicken to live a bad life than to lead no life at all.  I will tentatively assume here that 
the answer is “No,” as reasoning along these lines leads to absurd consequences.
 Cf. Singer 1980, Norcross 2004, and Kagan 2011.3
equivalent to the average badness of twenty-five people choosing to kill twenty-five chickens 
together.  This is what Budolfson means when he says that Singer, Norcross, and Kagan equate 
the moral value of an individual’s meat purchase with the average effect of everybody’s pur-
chases.
The problem, as Budolfson points out, is that purchases often aren’t distributed in a random se-
ries—and, in fact, we generally know that they are not.  Suppose that, aside from your own pur-
chases, the number of chickens purchased per day at the local butcher can be accurately mod-
eled by rolling two twelve-sided dice.  There are days when just 2 chickens are sold, and days 
when 24 are.  But there will be many more days when 12 chickens are sold.  Likewise, there are 
many, many days when fewer than 12 chickens will have been sold by the time you find yourself 
considering whether to buy a chicken than there will be days when 22 have already been sold. 
Given this sort of purchasing series, the expected badness of your chicken purchase will be far 
less than the badness of killing one chicken.  Days when you would make the difference—tip-
ping the shop from 22 to 23 chickens—will be exceedingly rare.  Supposing that you are aware 
of all this, then you should expect to have far less of a bad effect on the world by purchasing a 
chicken at the butcher shop than you should expect to have if you were to kill a chicken your-
self.  That, in turn, makes it substantially easier for the badness of this act to be swamped by its 
potential upside, e.g. your gustatory pleasure.  That is, to justify buying a chicken, the pleasure 
one will obtain from eating that chicken needn’t outweigh the badness of killing a chicken, but 
rather the badness of killing a chicken multiplied by the slight chance that one’s action will actu-
ally lead to a chicken getting killed.
But is the badness of purchasing a chicken in fact swamped in our world?  Here, things are far 
from clear.  On the one hand, reflection on how the meat-production industry operates indicates 
that, in the actual world, meat producers may be relatively insensitive to market signals.  For 
one thing, supply chains involve a number of layers (retailers, distributors, wholesalers, slaugh-
terhouses, producers, etc.), offering multiple opportunities for an individual market signal to get 
lost along the way.  In other words, for one’s signal to make a difference, it must get all the way 
from the point of purchase up to the farmers who are actually raising the relevant sort of animal. 
Every step along the way, however, is at least somewhat waste-tolerant, meaning that many, 
many signals will get lost before one actually gets through.  Each layer is like the butcher we 
considered above, who is only sensitive to whether 23 chickens have been sold.  Another rele-
vant consideration is that demand for meat products tends not to fluctuate randomly in the real 
world, aside from chance events like disease scares.  Rather, demand for meat grows roughly in 
accord with population and wealth.  What’s more, meat distributors may also be willing to sup-
plement standing orders (for, say, 25 chickens) with much smaller batches (of, say, 5 chickens) 
when demand unexpectedly spikes in a region.  Finally, there is excess demand for meat prod-
ucts in the real world—particularly in the developing world—meaning that the question is not so 
much whether so much meat will be produced but just how profitable it will be to sell it.  Given 
how cheap it is to produce meat in many places around the world, what stands in the way of 
more meat production is plausibly the lack of available land and water rather than a lack of po-
tential profit.  We thus appear to be far closer to the world of Chicken Demon than we might ini-
tially have anticipated.
On the other hand, the negative effects of raising and killing chickens are also far worse in our 
world than we have been supposing so far.  Labor exploitation is rampant in the meat-produc-
tion industry, and is not easily avoided by purchasing free-range or other “ethically-treated” meat 
products.  Consumers have shown relatively little interest in treating workers, as opposed to an-
imals themselves, more humanely.  Likewise, the negative environmental effects of raising 
chickens in the way we do must also be factored in.
Where does this leave us?  Do we make a difference via our consumption habits?  The answer 
would seem to be: possibly, but very little if we do.  Still, that small chance may still be enough 
to offer a consequentialist justification for being vegetarian.  One might, for instance, think that it 
is unacceptable to give one’s child some medicine that will make her recover faster from a minor 
cold if that medicine has even a one in a million chance to killing her.  On the other hand, we 
might find this trade-off acceptable if what we’re dealing with isn’t a minor cold, but something 
causing her significant discomfort.  It seems that much hinges on the costs that are to be tallied 
on the other side of the ledger.  Many people think of giving up meat as a serious cost in terms 
of gustatory pleasure, but that disvalue is likely to be front-loaded.  Once one learns to cook 
vegetarian and navigate the vegetarian culinary world, there is scant evidence that one ends up 
enjoying food any less, pace the claims of many a committed meat-eater.  What’s more, the po-
tential health benefits of vegetarianism are well-documented.   These considerations make it 4
unclear just how the ledger will lean; much depends on some actual, and rather complicated, 
empirical facts that we cannot simply discern from the armchair.
What Budolfson’s response to the Singer/Norcross/Kagan line should make clear, however, is 
the following.  Whereas act consequentialism might have initially seemed appealing in that it 
explained why, if we ought collectively to refrain from purchasing meat, then we ought individu-
ally to do so, this transition from the collective to individual ought relies on some highly ques-
tionable empirical assumptions.  The act consequentialist can only justifiably endorse this sort of 
argument if certain contingent features of the world turn out to be a particular sort of way. 
What’s more, it is highly questionable whether the world turns out to be this way.  For dedicated 
vegetarians, this is likely to seem like an odd result.  What was wanted was an argument for 
vegetarianism per se, not an argument for vegetarianism that is held hostage by certain recon-
dite details about the market for meat products—let alone an argument that depends on certain 
recondite details that look unlikely to obtain in the real world!  If one is looking for an argument 
for vegetarianism per se, then Budolfson is surely correct in pointing out that act consequential-
ism looks poorly situated to provide such an argument.
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